## Interactions

Introduction to Statistics

### HIGHLY NON-LINEAR WORLD



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\* Intuition: what's the effect of parenthood on earnings? Well, *depends*.

### Women's earnings drop significantly after having a child. Men's don't.



Source: "Children and gender inequality: Evidence from Denmark," National Bureau of Economic Research



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\* Intuition: does money buy you happiness? Well, *depends*.

Average subjective happiness by equivalised household income percentile (after housing costs): UK, 2014-16



Notes: Each dot represents the average level of well-being for a percentile of household income (measured after housing costs), ranging from percentile 1 on the far left of the chart to percentile 100 on the far right. The lines are logarithmic lines of best fit. Source: RF analysis of DWP, Family Resources Survey; pooled data for 2014-15 to 2016-17

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- \* In the meantime, **visualisation**, **visualisation**, **visualisation** 
  - \* With complex models, plots are much clearer than regression tables.

# Regression: Recap

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- \* How do we pick the coefficients?
- \* The most common method (not the only one!) is Ordinary Least
   Squares (OLS) choose the combination of coefficients that
   minimise the sum of squared residuals.

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\* So OLS will choose  $Y = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_1 + \hat{\beta}_2 X_2 + \hat{\beta}_3 X_3 \dots \hat{\beta}_p X_p + \hat{\epsilon}$ so that  $\sum_{i=1}^n \hat{\epsilon}_i^2 = \sum_{i=1}^n (Y - \hat{Y}_i)^2$  is minimised.

	Dependent variable:
	Life Satisfaction (0–10)
Age	0.013*** (0.004)
Income Decile	0.163*** (0.019)
Female	0.288*** (0.100)
Religiosity (0–10)	0.022 (0.017)
Years of Education	-0.003 (0.014)
Divorced	-0.354 (0.299)
Single	-0.118 (0.131)
Widowed	-0.412** (0.189)
Constant	5.713*** (0.321)
Observations	1,601
R <sup>2</sup>	0.078
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.073
Residual Std. Error	1.947 (df = 1592)
F Statistic	$16.778^{***}$ (df = 8; 1592)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

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- \* The **adjusted R-squared**, which quantifies the extent to which the model as a whole explains variation in the outcome variable.

```
Call:
lm(formula = life_satisf ~ age + income_decile + female + religiosity +
    years_education + marital_status, data = ess)
Residuals:
   Min
            10 Median
                           3Q
                                  Max
-8.1662 -0.8452 0.2721 1.2738 3.8794
Coefficients:
                        Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
                        5.712586 0.320715 17.812 < 2e-16 ***
(Intercept)
                        0.013353 0.003510 3.804 0.000148 ***
age
income_decile
                        0.163156
                                 0.019339 8.437 < 2e-16 ***
female
                                  0.099643 2.889 0.003914 **
                        0.287897
religiosity
                        0.022203
                                  0.016572 1.340 0.180513
                                  0.014112 -0.226 0.821429
years_education
                       -0.003186
marital_status divorced -0.353683
                                  0.299287 -1.182 0.237480
                                  0.130715 -0.903 0.366491
marital_status single
                       -0.118078
                                  0.188733 -2.184 0.029090 *
marital_status widowed -0.412239
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

Residual standard error: 1.947 on 1592 degrees of freedom (603 observations deleted due to missingness) Multiple R-squared: 0.07776, Adjusted R-squared: 0.07312 F-statistic: 16.78 on 8 and 1592 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16</pre>

### **OLS** Assumptions
#### 1. Linearity

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\* We also assume 5. Homoskedasticity and 6. Normality, rushed through last time...

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- \* One popular fix: heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (more conservative).

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- \* To calculate the *t*-statistic and the *p*-value, we need to know the full sampling distribution of the estimate. This depends on (unobserved) population errors.
- \* Useful to assume that they are normally distributed (as we model them as 'random').



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  - \* Visual check: histogram of residuals.



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  - \* **Back-door criterion**: Z is a 'good control' if
    - 1. Z is not a descendant of X (not **post-treatment**), and
    - 2. Z blocks a path between X and Y **that contains an arrow into X**.
      - \* i.e. Z is a common cause of X and Y (*a*) or is the mediator of the relationship between an unobserved common cause U and either X or Y (respectively, *b* and *c*).

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- \* These can: (1) **block the causal path**  $X \rightarrow Y(d)$ , (2) are **effects** of the outcome (*e*), or (3) **open a backdoor path** to a previously unbiased causal path (*f*, *g* and *h*).



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- But in presence of unobserved
   confounders, 'pointless' control
   can make existing bias worse (k).
- \* Also, they can be a problem if they open a backdoor path (*l*, collider bias).
- Bottom line: theory should inform your choice of controls, not data availability.



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  - \* Climate Worry =  $\alpha + \beta_1$  Degree +  $\beta_2$  Left +  $\epsilon$

# Example: Regression Table

	Dependent variable:
	wrclmch
educationdegree	0.275***
	(0.049)
ideologyleft	0.235***
	(0.049)
Constant	2.712***
	(0.044)
Observations	1 699
R2	0.031
Adjusted R2	0.030
Residual Std. Error	0.923 (df = 1696)
F Statistic	27.511*** (df = 2; 1696)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01









Climate Worry =  $\alpha + \beta_1$  Degree +  $\beta_2$  Left +  $\beta_3$ (Degree × Left) +  $\epsilon$ 

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Dependent variable:

	Climate Worry (1–5)
Intercept	2.793*** (0.05)
Degree	-0.012 (0.09)
Left	0.121** (0.06)
Degree × Left	0.398*** (0.11)

#### Climate Worry = $\alpha + \beta_1$ Degree + $\beta_2$ Left + $\beta_3$ (Degree × Left) + $\epsilon$

Dependent variable:

	Climate Worry (1–5)		Degree = 0	Degree = 1
Intercept	2.793*** (0.05)	Left = 0		
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Left	0.121** (0.06)	Left = 1		
Degree × Left	0.398*** (0.11)			

\* If Degree = 0 and Left = 0, then

 $\hat{Y} = \alpha + \beta_1(0) + \beta_2(0) + \beta_3(0 \times 0) = \alpha$ 

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Left	0.121** (0.06)	Left = 1		
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\* If Degree = 1 and Left = 0, then

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Degree	-0.012 (0.09)			
Left	0.121** (0.06)	Left = 1	2.914	
Degree × Left	0.398*** (0.11)			

\* If Degree = 0 and Left = 1, then

 $\hat{Y} = \alpha + \beta_1(0) + \beta_2(1) + \beta_3(0 \times 1) = \alpha + \beta_2$ 

#### Climate Worry = $\alpha + \beta_1$ Degree + $\beta_2$ Left + $\beta_3$ (Degree × Left) + $\epsilon$

Dependent variable:

	Climate Worry (1–5)		Degree = 0	Degree = 1
Intercept	2.793*** (0.05)	Left = 0	2.793	2.781
Degree	-0.012 (0.09)			
Left	0.121** (0.06)	Left = 1	2.914	
Degree × Left	0.398*** (0.11)			
# Solution: Interaction Term

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# Solution: Interaction Term

Predicted Worry about Climate Change (1-5 scale)



Call: lm(formula = wrclmch ~ education + ideol data = ess)	.ogy + <mark>education *</mark>	ideology,
Residuals: Min 1Q Median 3Q -2.30028 -0.79261 0.08619 0.21898 2.2	Max 21898	
Coefficients:		
Estimate St	d. Error t value	Pr(>ltl)
(Intercept) 2.79261	0.04900 56.997	< 2e-16 ***
educationdegree -0.01159	0.09257 -0.125	0.90036
ideologyleft 0.12120	0.05829 2.079	0.03776 *
educationdegree:ideologyleft 0.39805	0.10906 3.650	0.00027 ***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01	·*' 0.05 ·.' 0.1	''1

Residual standard error: 0.9192 on 1695 degrees of freedom (260 observations deleted due to missingness) Multiple R-squared: 0.03898, Adjusted R-squared: 0.03727 F-statistic: 22.91 on 3 and 1695 DF, p-value: 1.533e-14

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- \* This is a really good feature of lm(). Whenever you have interaction terms, you always want to control for the parent terms (*education* and *ideology*) as well as the interaction term.
- \* There is a way of telling R to include only the interaction term (*education* × *ideology*), but it's best you don't know because this is **wrong** 99% of the times.

	Climate Worry (1–5)
Intercept	2.793*** (0.05)
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- Here: large and significant we do have an important interaction.

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- \* In R, just pass the categorical variable:

```
lm(wrclmch \sim education + ideo_group + education*ideo_group, data = ess)
```

```
# or equivalently
```

lm(wrclmch ~ education\*ideo\_group, data = ess)



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- \*  $\beta_2$  is the predicted change in 'Worry' associated with of a **one-unit increase** in 'R-L Scale' when 'Degree' is zero (i.e. for non-graduates).
- \*  $\beta_3$  is tricky: it's the change in the effect of 'Degree' on 'Worry' as **we increase the value of 'L-R Scale' by one unit**. Easier to interpret significance and direction, use plots to show effect size.

Worry =  $\alpha + \beta_1$  Degree +  $\beta_2$ R-L Scale +  $\beta_3$  (R-L Scale × Degree) +  $\epsilon$ 

### Worry = $\alpha + \beta_1$ Degree + $\beta_2$ R-L Scale + $\beta_3$ (R-L Scale × Degree) + $\epsilon$

Dependent variable:

Climate Worry (1–5)

**R-L** Scale

Intercept

Degree

Degree  $\times$  R-L Scale

### Worry = $\alpha + \beta_1$ Degree + $\beta_2$ R-L Scale + $\beta_3$ (R-L Scale × Degree) + $\epsilon$

	Climate Worry (1–5)
ntercept	2.544*** (0.075)
Degree	
R-L Scale	
Degree × R-L Scale	

Worry =  $\alpha + \beta_1$  Degree +  $\beta_2$ R-L Scale +  $\beta_3$  (R-L Scale × Degree) +  $\epsilon$ 



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# Visualising Continuous Moderators (1)
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Quartiles of the

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Predicted Worry about Climate Change (1-5 scale)

- \* One solution: pick **some representative values of the moderator** and show predicted values of *Y* across treatment conditions.
- \* Some options:
  - \* Minimum and Maximum value.
  - \* Quartiles of the distribution.
  - \* Mean *plus* and *minus* one std.
    deviation.



\* A second solution: plot the effect of the treatment (Y-axis) by the value of the moderator (X-axis). This is known as a *conditional effect plot*.

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- \* Both linear coefficients refer to effect of a one-unit change.
- \* The interaction term's coefficient is the estimated **change in the effect of one year of education** on Climate Worry, associated with a **one-point increase in the R-L scale**.

Worry =  $\alpha + \beta_1$ EduYears +  $\beta_2$ R-L Scale +  $\beta_3$ (R-L Scale × EduYears) +  $\epsilon$ 

Worry =  $\alpha + \beta_1$ EduYears +  $\beta_2$ R-L Scale +  $\beta_3$ (R-L Scale × EduYears) +  $\epsilon$ 

Dependent variable:

Climate Worry (1–5)

Intercept

Edu Years

**R-L** Scale

Edu Years × R-L Scale

Worry =  $\alpha + \beta_1$ EduYears +  $\beta_2$ R-L Scale +  $\beta_3$ (R-L Scale × EduYears) +  $\epsilon$ 

Dependent variable:

Climate Worry (1–5)

Intercept

2.622\*\*\* (0.246)

Edu Years

**R-L** Scale

Edu Years × R-L Scale

Worry =  $\alpha + \beta_1$ EduYears +  $\beta_2$ R-L Scale +  $\beta_3$ (R-L Scale × EduYears) +  $\epsilon$ 

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Dependent variable:



# Predicted Values Plot



## **Conditional Effects Plot**

Effect of One Additional Year of Education On Climate Worry, Conditional On Right-Left Ideology



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- Software and math do not distinguish between treatment and moderator: the models we've just seen could be just as good to get at the effect of ideology on climate worry, conditional on education.
- \* It's up to you to **interpret things correctly**.

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- \* Potentially **infinite** combinations of interaction terms. You will get 'lucky' and find something significant at some point.

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- \* Temptation for 'fishing' with interactions is particularly strong also because interactions tend to be **noisy**.
- \* Our main effects are already noisy, because they're estimated with uncertainty.
- Interactions estimate a difference between two noisy things. So they're even noisier. Surprisingly big effects could pop up because of a few outliers.
- \* You need very large sample sizes to estimate an interaction effect precisely (16× larger than for a main effect).

\* More on pitfalls of interactions:

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- \* Brambor, T., Clark, W., and Golder, M. (2006) "Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analyses." *Political Analysis* 14(1), 63-82.

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- \* Gelman, A. (2023) "You need 16 times the sample size to estimate an interaction than to estimate a main effect, explained", blogpost in *Statistical Modeling*, *Causal Inference*, and Social Science.

# Check if you understand (1)

\* Does 'winning' (i.e. voting for the party that forms the government) make people feel happier?

Random Intercept, Interaction

.101*** (.021)
079*** (.029)
014** (.007)
034** (.018)
.018*** (.003)
3.166*** (.522)
.018*** (.006)
.435*** (.005)
26,133.8
12,996
16

Margit Tavits (2008) Representation, Corruption, and Subjective Well-Being, CPS.

# Check if you understand (1)

Does 'winning' (i.e. voting for the party that forms the government) make people feel happier? Marginal Effect of *Winner* on Subjective Well-Being at Different Levels of Corruption, European Sample



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# Check if you understand (2)

\* Does telling people their party is going to lose the next election (*threat* treatment vs *reassurance* control) make them angrier?

Anger and Party Threat 2 1 Partisan strength -.01 (.03) .01 (.03) Partisan identity -.07 (.07) .26 (.06)\*\*\* Party threat/reassurance .03 (.08) .10 (.04)\*\* Partisan strength  $\times$  threat/reassurance -.01(.04)Partisan identity × threat/reassurance .44 (.09)\*\*\* Ideological issue intensity .06 (.05) .07 (.05) – .03 (.07) Ideological intensity × threat/reassurance -.03 (.07) Knowledge – .19 (.10)\* -.19 (.09)\*\* Gender (male) - .04 (.02)\*\* -.03 (.02)\* Education – .05 (.04) -.04 (.04) Age (decades) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) Constant .42 (.11)\*\*\* .46 (.11)\*\*\* Adj. R<sup>2</sup> 0.22 0.24 Ν 1482 1482

Huddy, L., Mason, L., & Aarøe, L. (2015). Expressive partisanship: Campaign involvement, political emotion, and partisan identity. APSR, 109(1), 1-17.

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# Non-Linearities

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\* Variable transformations (if there's time). Commonly, taking the natural logarithm of the variables to reduce their skew.

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\* Variable transformations (if there's time). Commonly, taking the natural logarithm of the variables to reduce their skew.

\*  $Y = \alpha + \beta \log(X) + \epsilon$ 

\* Both approaches are consistent with linearity assumptions: regression are still 'linear in the  $\beta$ s'.

\* You might remember from high-school calculus the formula for a parabola:  $y = ax^2 + bx + c$ 

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- \* Characteristics of a parabolic curve:
- \* It is **U-shaped** ('opening up') if  $\beta_2 > 0$ . It is **n-shaped** ('opening down') if  $\beta_2 < 0$ .

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- \* Characteristics of a parabolic curve:
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\* It has **one** bend, known as its vertex, given by  $-\frac{\beta_1}{2\beta_2}$ 



# The coefficient of x<sup>2</sup> determines whether the parabola opens up or down



Example

\* Does **democracy** increase or decrease **trust in government**?

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\* We gather data on **Democracy** (0-10 scale) from V-Dem, and on the average country-level **Trust in Government** (1 = none at all, 4 = a great deal) from the World Values Survey (WVS).

#### Govt. Trust = $\alpha + \beta_1$ Democracy + $\epsilon$

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**Residuals of Govt. Trust ~ Democracy** 



democracy

#### Govt. Trust = $\alpha + \beta_1$ Democracy + $\beta_2$ Democracy<sup>2</sup> + $\epsilon$



#### Govt. Trust = $\alpha + \beta_1$ Democracy + $\beta_2$ Democracy<sup>2</sup> + $\epsilon$

#### Residuals of Govt. Trust ~ Democracy + Democracy-squared



Confidence in Government, WVS

democracy

#### Second-Degree Polynomial: Coefficients

Dependent variable:

Govt. Trust (1–4)

Intercept 3.337\*\*\* (0.152)

Democracy -0.508\*\*\* (0.076)

Democracy<sup>2</sup>  $0.046^{***}$  (0.008)



#### Second-Degree Polynomial: Coefficients

\* **Sign** of  $\beta_2$ : if  $\beta_2 > 0$ , U-shaped curve, if  $\beta_2 < 0$ , n-shaped curve.

 Dependent variable:

 Govt. Trust (1-4)

 Intercept
 3.337\*\*\* (0.152)

 Democracy
 -0.508\*\*\* (0.076)

 Democracy<sup>2</sup>
 0.046\*\*\* (0.008)



#### Second-Degree Polynomial: Coefficients

- \* **Sign** of  $\beta_2$ : if  $\beta_2 > 0$ , U-shaped curve, if  $\beta_2 < 0$ , n-shaped curve.
- \* **Significance** of  $\beta_2$ : tests against the null that the relationship is linear.

 Dependent variable:

 Govt. Trust (1-4)

 Intercept
 3.337\*\*\* (0.152)

 Democracy
 -0.508\*\*\* (0.076)

 Democracy2
 0.046\*\*\* (0.008)


- \* **Sign** of  $\beta_2$ : if  $\beta_2 > 0$ , U-shaped curve, if  $\beta_2 < 0$ , n-shaped curve.
- \* **Significance** of  $\beta_2$ : tests against the null that the relationship is linear.
- \* Vertex:  $-\beta_1/(2\beta_2)$ . This is where sign of the relationship changes — may fall outside the observed range of *X*.



Dependent variable:

Govt. Trust (1–4)

Intercept 3.337\*\*\* (0.152)

Democracy -0.508\*\*\* (0.076)

Democracy<sup>2</sup>  $0.046^{***}$  (0.008)



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- \* At each value *X* the predicted **rate of change** in *Y* varies.
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   and β<sub>2</sub> mean little on their own,
   they must be interpreted together



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  - \*  $-0.508 + 0.092 \times 8 = +0.228$ , etc.



## Polynomial Terms in R

> model1 <- lm(conf\_goverment ~ democracy + I(democracy^2), data = qog)
> stargazer(model1, type = "text", single.row = TRUE)

	Dependent variable:		
	conf_goverment		
democracy I(democracy2) Constant	-0.508*** (0.076) 0.046*** (0.008) 3.337*** (0.152)		
Observations R2 Adjusted R2 Residual Std. Error F Statistic	76 0.417 0.401 0.366 (df = 73) 26.076*** (df = 2; 73)		
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

## Visualisation: Predicted Values Plot



## Visualisation: Conditional Effect Plot



# Check if you understand

\* How does a leader's time in office affect spending in Chinese counties?

Dependent Variable: Annual Growth Rate	Party Secretary Model Coefficient (Standard Error)	
of Expenditures Per Capita Explanatory Variables		
(Time in office) <sup>2</sup>	-0.3946**	-0.4860**
	(0.1728)	(0.2049)
Time in office	2.4793**	3.1624**
	(1.0212)	(1.2252)
Annual growth rate of revenues per capita	0.2493***	0.2589***
	(0.0142)	(0.0166)
Annual growth rate of subsidies per capita		0.1411***
		(0.0092)

\* Guo, G. (2009). China's local political budget cycles. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(3), 621-632.

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- \* Interpretation gets trickier. Use visualisation tools to get a sense of what you're fitting.



 $\mathbb{X}$ 



CEA45 Archived @WhiteHouseCEA45 · Follow

#### Replying to @WhiteHouseCEA45

To better visualize observed data, we also continually update a curve-fitting exercise to summarize COVID-19's observed trajectory. Particularly with irregular data, curve fitting can improve data visualization. As shown, IHME's mortality curves have matched the data fairly well.







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Are Smaller Countries More Democratic?






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> model1 <- lm(log(gdp\_per\_capita) ~ log(settler\_mortality), data = colonialism)
> stargazer(model1, type = "text", single.row = TRUE)

	Dependent variable:
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log(settler_mortality) Constant	-0.570*** (0.078) 10.700*** (0.374)
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## Wrap-Up: Non-Linearities

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  - \* Including higher-order terms comes with the risk of overfitting. **Theory** should inform model specification.
- \* Log-transformation are used more narrowly:
  - \* Non-linearities produced by skewed, positive variables.
  - \* **Assume proportional relationships**: halving *X* has approximately the same effect size on *Y* as doubling *X*.

## Thank you for your kind attention!

Leonardo Carella leonardo.carella@nuffield.ox.ac.uk