


Electoral Systems




Leonardo Carella (Nuffield College)

201 Comparative Government
University of Oxford


27 January 2025

- ▶ How electoral systems (ES) work.
 - ▶ Working definition: “The **set of rules** that structure how votes are cast at elections for a **representative assembly** and how these votes are converted into seats in that assembly.” (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005)
- ▶ How they matter.
- ▶ Where they come from.


The basic mechanism: ES are rules translating votes into seats.




Actors adapt strategically to the rules.



Systemic effects of ES on party systems (and beyond).



The problem of endogeneity: ES as a *product* of politics.



Adapted from Shugart and Taagepera (2017), Chapter 1.

Classification and Functioning of Electoral Systems

Many dimensions of variation:

- ▶ **Electoral formula**

- ▶ What's the rule for assigning seats to parties or candidates?

- ▶ **Districting arrangements**

- ▶ how many seats per district? (**district magnitude**)
- ▶ how many territorial levels? (tiers)


- ▶ **Ballot structure/formula**

- ▶ How many votes? For parties or candidates? Ranked or categorical? How are seats assigned *within* parties?


- ▶ **Other provisions**

- ▶ legal thresholds, compensatory tiers, majority bonuses.

The usual classification: **majoritarian**, **proportional**, **mixed**.



From Clark, Golder and Golder (2017), Chapter 13.



From IDEA database (2016).

- ▶ Nominally on the basis of the **electoral formula**, but partly overlaps with **district magnitude**:
 - ▶ Majoritarian → single-member districts (mostly).
 - ▶ Proportional → multi-member systems (always).
 - ▶ Mixed → Both, in overlaid tiers.

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 - ▶ PR → vote-seat proportionality.
 - ▶ Mixed → Something in between?

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- ▶ Maps onto differences in proportionality of outcomes:
 - ▶ Majoritarian → boost large parties' seat share.
 - ▶ PR → vote-seat proportionality.
 - ▶ Mixed → Something in between?
- ▶ Claim: distinct 'visions of democracy': *accountability* vs *representation* (Powell, 2000; Lijphart, 1994).

Alternative perspective (Shugart and Taagepera, 2017):¹

- ▶ Centres **district magnitude**: “arguably the single most important number for election outcomes.”

¹originally developed in Taagepera (2007).

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
- ▶ Centres **district magnitude**: “arguably the single most important number for election outcomes.”
- ▶ Provided a ‘sensible’ electoral formula (more votes → more seats) ‘simple’ ES can be reduced to 2 components:
 - ▶ Assembly size (S)
 - ▶ District magnitude (M), one tier: from $M = 1$ to $M = S$.

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 - ▶ Assembly size (S)
 - ▶ District magnitude (M), one tier: from $M = 1$ to $M = S$.
- ▶ The most common majoritarian system (**FPTP**) and proportional system (**list PR**) are *both* simple systems. Their districts both lie on a continuum, defined by M .

¹originally developed in Taagepera (2007).











Jamaica, $M = 1$









Portugal, $M \approx 10$

Netherlands, $M = 150$









Example: $M = 6$, d'Hondt divisors (1, 2, 3, 4...)

Party	V	Seats	% 	% 
 Soc-Dem	4,000			40%
 Liberal	2,300			23%
 Chr-Dem	1,400			14%
 Populist	1,100			11%
 Green	650			6.5%
 No-Tax	550			5.5%
Total	10,000			









Example: $M = 6$, d'Hondt divisors (1, 2, 3, 4...)

Party	V	$V/2$	Seats	% 	% 
 Soc-Dem	4,000	2,000	1		40%
 Liberal	2,300				23%
 Chr-Dem	1,400				14%
 Populist	1,100				11%
 Green	650				6.5%
 No-Tax	550				5.5%
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Example: $M = 6$, d'Hondt divisors (1, 2, 3, 4...)

Party	V	$V/2$	$V/3$	Seats	% 	% 
 Soc-Dem	4,000	2,000	1,333	2		40%
 Liberal	2,300	1,150		1		23%
 Chr-Dem	1,400					14%
 Populist	1,100					11%
 Green	650					6.5%
 No-Tax	550					5.5%
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Example: $M = 6$, d'Hondt divisors (1, 2, 3, 4...)









Party	V	$V/2$	$V/3$	$V/4$	Seats	% 	% 
 Soc-Dem	4,000	2,000	1,333	1000	3	50%	40%
 Liberal	2,300	1,150	767		2	33%	23%
 Chr-Dem	1,400	700			1	17%	14%
 Populist	1,100						11%
 Green	650						6.5%
 No-Tax	550						5.5%
Total	10,000						

Example: $M = 1$, d'Hondt divisors (1, 2, 3, 4...)

Party	V	$V/2$	Seats	% 	% 
 Soc-Dem	4,000	2,000	1	100%	40%
 Liberal	2,300				23%
 Chr-Dem	1,400				14%
 Populist	1,100				11%
 Green	650				7%
 No-Tax	550				5%









For $M = 1$, PR collapses into ‘first past the post’ (FPTP).

Example: $M = 20$, d'Hondt divisors (1, 2, 3, 4...)









Party	V	$V/2$	$V/3...$	$V/5...$	$V/8$	Seats	% 	% 
	4,000	2,000	1,333	800	500	8	40%	40%
	2,300	1,150	767	460		5	25%	23%
	1,400	700	467			3	15%	14%
	1,100	550				2	10%	11%
	650					1	5%	6.5%
	550					1	5%	5.5%

As the district magnitude increases, (1) seat % become more proportional to vote %, and (2) more parties gain seats.

Back to $M = 6$, d'Hondt divisors (1, 2, 3, 4...)

Party	V	$V/2$	$V/3$	$V/4$	Seats	% 	% 
	4,000	2,000	1,333	1,000	3	50%	40%
	2,300	1,150	767		2	33%	23%
	1,400	700			1	17%	14%
	1,100						11%
	650						6.5%
	550						5.5%








$M = 6$, Sainte-Laguë divisors (1, 3, 5, 7...)

Party	V	$V/3$	$V/5$	$V/7$	Seats	% 	% 
	4,000	1,333	800	571	3	50%	40%
	2,300	767			1	17%	23%
	1,400	467			1	17%	14%
	1,100	367			1	17%	11%
	650						6.5%
	550						5.5%

‘Micromega’ rule: small parties like large M and large divisors, and vice versa: large parties like small M and divisors








$M = 6$, Droop quota, largest remainder method.

Droop quota: $\frac{V}{M+1} \rightarrow q = \frac{10,000}{6+1} = \mathbf{1429}$

Party	V	$V/1429$	Quotas	Remainders	Surplus	Seats	% 
	4,000	2.80	2				
	2,300	1.61	1				
	1,400	0.98	0				
	1,100	0.77	0				
	650	0.46	0				
	550	0.39	0				
Total	10,000						

$M = 6$, Droop quota, largest remainder method.

Droop quota: $\frac{V}{M+1} \rightarrow q = \frac{10,000}{6+1} = \mathbf{1429}$

Party	V	$V/1429$	Quotas	Remainders	Surplus	Seats	% 
	4,000	2.80	2	0.80	+1	3	50%
	2,300	1.61	1	0.61	–	1	17%
	1,400	0.98	0	0.98	+1	1	17%
	1,100	0.77	0	0.77	+1	1	17%
	650	0.46	0	0.46	–		
	550	0.39	0	0.39	–		
Total	10,000						

Micromega rule applies: larger q , like Hare ($\frac{V}{M}$), favour small parties; smaller q , like Imperiali ($\frac{V}{M+2}$), favour large parties.

Multiple preferences in single-member districts:

- ▶ Alternative Vote (Australia, Fiji), aka ‘Instant Runoff’
 - ▶ Losing candidates’ second-, third-, and lower preferences are redistributed until someone gets 50% of the vote.
 - ▶ In practice, most similar to ‘simple’ FPTP.
- ▶ Two-Round Systems (France, Mali)
 - ▶ Common in Presidential, rare in legislative elections.
 - ▶ Opportunities for alliances between rounds sustain fluid multi-party systems. Highly disproportional outcomes.

Candidate, not party, vote in multi-member districts:

- ▶ Single Non-Transferable Vote, SNTV (formerly, Japan)
 - ▶ Single candidate preference, top M candidates win.
- ▶ Single Transferable Vote, STV (Ireland, Malta)
 - ▶ Roughly equivalent to AV in multi-member districts.

Rare, but interesting because of the highly personalised, candidate-centred (vs party-centred) nature.

Corrections to simple systems:

- ▶ Legal thresholds
 - ▶ Aims to **reduce number of parties**.
 - ▶ From marginal (2%, Denmark) to decisive (10%, Turkey).
- ▶ Compensatory upper tiers (South Africa, Austria, Sweden)
 - ▶ Aims to **improve proportionality** (mostly).
 - ▶ Disproportionality from district outcomes compensated at higher territorial level with 'levelling seats'.

Often tractable within the framework of simple systems.

Defined by two **overlapping** sets of districts: a single-member district tier (almost always FPTP) and a multi-member district tier (almost always list PR). (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001)



74 FPTP districts



26 PR districts

In fact, two different beasts:

- ▶ Mixed-Member Proportional (**MMP**)
 - ▶ List PR tier ‘compensates’ for FPTP disproportionality.
 - ▶ Effectively, functions like two-tier PR, where the lower tier has $M = 1$, and the upper tier attributes levelling seats.


In fact, two different beasts:

- ▶ Mixed-Member Proportional (**MMP**)
 - ▶ List PR tier ‘compensates’ for FPTP disproportionality.
 - ▶ Effectively, functions like two-tier PR, where the lower tier has $M = 1$, and the upper tier attributes levelling seats.
- ▶ Mixed-Member Majoritarian (**MMM**)
 - ▶ No connection in the distribution of seats across tiers: two ‘parallel elections’ taking place simultaneously.

- ▶ Larger difference in disproportionality *within* mixed systems than between either MMM and majoritarian or MMP and PR systems.
- ▶ Measured with Gallagher's Disproportionality Index:

$$LSI = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (\%v_i - \%s_i)^2}$$

from Raabe and Linhart (2018)



Two approaches:

- ▶ *Controlled Comparison* (Moser and Scheiner, 2004, 2012):
 - ▶ MM tiers approximate distinct ES → we can study ES effects within the same country.
 - ▶ e.g. more constituency service in FPTP tier, as in pure FPTP (Breunig et al., 2022).
- ▶ *Contamination Effects* (Ferrara and Herron, 2005):
 - ▶ Interaction of systems → unique institutional environment.
 - ▶ e.g. single-member district elections do not ‘collapse’ into two-party races as in pure FPTP (Cox and Schoppa, 2002).

Consequences of Electoral Systems

Duverger's Law (1954): 'The simple majority, single ballot system [FPTP] favours the two-party system'.²

- ▶ Applied primarily to the **district**, but by implication extended to the party system in the **legislature**.

²Already pointed out by Droop (1881).

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
- ▶ Applied primarily to the **district**, but by implication extended to the party system in the **legislature**.

Two reasons:

- ▶ *Mechanical effects*: votes for parties other than the top 2 are 'wasted' disproportionately (as in our example).
- ▶ *Psychological effects*: voters abandon third parties (**strategic voting**); parties and politicians desist from running or join existing viable parties (**strategic exit**). (Cox, 1997; Ziegfeld, 2021)


²Already pointed out by Droop (1881).

How to measure party system size? What parties ‘count’?




‘Effective Number of Parties’ (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979)

$$N_S = \frac{1}{\sum (p_i)^2}$$




CASE 1




CASE 2






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
CASE 2



$$\text{CASE 1 } N_S = \frac{1}{(0.02)^2 + (0.50)^2 + (0.05)^2 + (0.41)^2 + (0.02)^2} \approx 2.37$$



CASE 1



CASE 2



$$\text{CASE 1 } N_S = \frac{1}{(0.02)^2 + (0.50)^2 + (0.05)^2 + (0.41)^2 + (0.02)^2} \approx 2.37$$

$$\text{CASE 2 } N_S = \frac{1}{(0.16)^2 + (0.30)^2 + (0.18)^2 + (0.24)^2 + (0.12)^2} \approx 4.54$$

The **Seat Product Model** quantifies ES \rightarrow party system relationship, generalising Duverger's Law.³

In simple systems:

$$N_S = (M \ S)^{\frac{1}{6}}$$

Effective No. of Parties

Mean District Magnitude

Assembly Size

The diagram shows the equation $N_S = (M \ S)^{\frac{1}{6}}$. The variable N_S is enclosed in a light purple box. The variable M is enclosed in a light blue box, and the variable S is enclosed in a light red box. A purple arrow points from the text 'Effective No. of Parties' (underlined) down to the N_S box. A blue arrow points from the text 'Mean District Magnitude' (underlined) up to the M box. A red arrow points from the text 'Assembly Size' (underlined) up to the S box.

³Shugart and Taagepera (2017), Chapter 7. Taagepera (2007).

The **Seat Product Model** quantifies ES \rightarrow party system relationship, generalising Duverger's Law.³


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
$$N_S = (M \times S)^{\frac{1}{6}}$$


Effective No. of Parties
Mean District Magnitude Assembly Size


- ▶ **Barbados** $N_S = (1 \times 30)^{\frac{1}{6}} = 1.76$. Actual avg.: 1.5.
- ▶ **Britain** $N_S = (1 \times 650)^{\frac{1}{6}} = 2.9$. Actual avg.: 2.3.
- ▶ **Spain** $N_S = (6.7 \times 350)^{\frac{1}{6}} = 3.6$. Actual avg.: 3.1.
- ▶ **Israel** $N_S = (120 \times 120)^{\frac{1}{6}} = 4.9$. Actual avg.: 5.3.

³Shugart and Taagepera (2017), Chapter 7. Taagepera (2007).









from Raabe and Linhart (2018)

- ▶ **Executive formation:** majoritarian systems → single-party majorities; PR → coalition governments.
- ▶ **Polarisation:** permissive ES yield higher ideological dispersion. (Cox, 1990; Dow, 2011; Hanretty, 2022)
- ▶ **Elite-public congruence:** Proportionality leads to more ideologically representative legislatures. (But perhaps not governments: Powell, 2006; Golder and Stramski, 2010.)
- ▶ **Government accountability:** Single-party majorities allow greater clarity of responsibility. (Also debatable, and debated: Fisher and Hobolt, 2010; Kam et al., 2020.)

Across and within countries, *proportionality* clearly boosts turnout *but* turnout marginally declines as *number of parties* increases ($N_S > 3$):




Figure 2. Turnout versus effective number of parties: observed turnout and predicted from the nonlinear multilevel model of turnout (country-level).




Figure 3. Turnout versus effective number of parties: observed turnout and predicted turnout from the nonlinear multilevel model of turnout versus district magnitude, Swiss National Council Elections, 1919–2011.


Explaining proportionality \rightarrow turnout positive relationship:

- ▶ **Efficacy:** under majoritarianism, voting for small parties (Karp and Banducci, 2008) or in non-competitive districts (Selb, 2009) is perceived as making no difference.
 - ▶ short- and long-term effects (Vowles et al., 2017)
- ▶ **Voter-Party Proximity:** broader, more diverse ideological spectrum under PR rules (Chen, 2011).
- ▶ **Mobilisation:** when only marginal seats matter, parties target a narrow set of pivotal voters; when seats can be won everywhere (large- M PR), bigger and broader mobilisational efforts are needed (Cox et al., 2016).


Explaining number of parties \rightarrow turnout negative relationship:

- ▶ **Oversized Coalitions** (Brockington, 2004)
 - ▶ Retrospectively, reduce clarity of responsibility.
 - ▶ Prospectively, reduce control over government composition and policy.
- ▶ **Complexity**: as parties and candidates increase, information acquisition becomes more cognitively demanding (Zagórski, 2022; Muraoka and Barceló, 2019).

Proportionality → **more left-wing governments**




Proportionality \rightarrow **higher welfare spending**



Helgason (2016)

Proportionality → **more income redistribution**



Zuazu (2022)

Assume for now it's causal. Some explanations:


- ▶ **Class Coalitions:** faced with a two-party choice, the middle class fears taxation and sides with capital; multipartyism needed low-/middle-income coalitions (Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Liñeira and Riera, 2024).
- ▶ **Broad-based policies:** larger electoral and government coalitions under PR require broader social programmes; harder to target spending (Persson and Tabellini, 2006).
- ▶ **Geography:** small-district bias against urban (left, working class) vote, as it's very clustered (Rodden, 2019).

Two ways to spin PR's political economy equilibrium:


- ▶ **Inefficiency:** PR's coalitions multiply the number of 'special interests' to cater to, leading to producer power, higher prices for consumers, uncompetitive structures. (Rogowski and Kayser, 2002; Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006)
- ▶ **Investment:** broad-interest policies like mass education and subsidised worker training lead to high employment in skilled sectors, competitive exports, and growth (Iversen and Soskice, 2010; Knutsen, 2011).

- ▶ So far we have looked at ‘**inter**-party effects’: outcomes that depend on how ES allocate seats *between* parties.
- ▶ But ES also affect how seats are allocated to candidates *within* parties. Consequences produced via this type of mechanism are known as ‘**intra**-party effects’.
- ▶ To study intra-party effects on e.g. *individual politicians*’ behaviour, we should consider another dimension of ES variation: **ballot formula**.


Simplifying a lot, we can sort ballot formulae on a continuum:




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
Simplifying a lot, we can sort ballot formulae on a continuum:



Real-world ballot formulae are bewilderingly complex: ‘flexible’ lists, *panachage*, rankings, multiple/negative preferences etc.

Carey and Shugart (1995): incentives for ‘personal vote-seeking’ behaviour increase in M under candidate-centred systems, and decrease in M under party-centred systems:

FIGURE 1. District Size, Ballot Structure and Candidate Incentives



Source: Adapted from Carey and Shugart (1995) and Shugart (2005).

Implication: FPTP is more candidate-centred than CLPR, but less so than OLPR. Grofman (2005) disagrees.

Evidence from mixed-member systems (FPTP vs CLPR):

- ▶ FPTP MPs more likely to respond to constituents, to sit in committees that distribute targetable goods ('pork barrel') (Breunig et al., 2022; Gschwend and Zittel, 2018).

Evidence from PARTIREP survey:

- ▶ Most constituency service and personal campaigns in STV, OLPR, FPTP (Deschouwer and Depauw, 2014).

Evidence from the European Parliament:

- ▶ MEPs subject to different rules: for Hix (2004), those elected in candidate-centred ES are less beholden to parties.

Electoral Systems Origins and Change

“In most cases it makes little sense to treat electoral systems as independent variables and party systems as dependent. The party strategists will generally have decisive influence on electoral legislation and opt for the systems of aggregation most likely to consolidate their position.” (Rokkan, 1968)

“Institutions are no more than rules and rules are themselves the product of social decisions [...] institutions are probably best seen as congealed tastes.” (Riker, 1980)

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Empirically, we observe two phases of profound reform, framing a period of overall stability:

- Spread of PR coinciding with franchise expansion: Belgium (1899), Finland (1907), Sweden (1909), Denmark (1915), Germany, Switzerland (1918), Norway, Italy (1919), Ireland (1921), Chile (1925).

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- ▶ Spread of PR coinciding with franchise expansion: Belgium (1899), Finland (1907), Sweden (1909), Denmark (1915), Germany, Switzerland (1918), Norway, Italy (1919), Ireland (1921), Chile (1925).
- ▶ Around the 1990s: institutional (re-)engineering in third-wave democracies, and diffusion of mixed-member systems (Mexico, Russia, Venezuela, Bolivia, but also: Italy, New Zealand, Japan).

But also: **all the time** (on a smaller scale).

- ▶ Diffusion of ‘correctives’ to PR: thresholds and smaller district magnitudes (Bol, Pilet and Riera, 2015)
- ▶ Spread of ‘personal vote’ (Renwick and Pilet, 2016).
- ▶ Gender quotas/placement mandates (Hughes et al., 2019).

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And sometimes not even that small:

- ▶ ES reform ‘cycles’: Italy (1993, 2005, 2015, 2017), Romania (1992, 2000, 2008, 2015), Greece (1982, 1989, 2004, 2020).
- ▶ ES reform within democratic backsliding: Russia (2005), Venezuela (2009), Hungary (2011), Hong Kong (2021).

‘Rational choice’ perspective:

- ▶ ES result from the collective choice of parties. The equilibrium is a system where no coalition with the power to enforce electoral change gains politically from it.
- ▶ ES change results from shifts in the parties-in-power’s perceived future benefits from current rules, due e.g. to changes in popularity or electorate composition.
- ▶ ES *reflect* constellation of actors at one point in time: multi-partyism occurs before, not after, the adoption of PR.

(Benoit, 2004; Colomer, 2005; Calvo, 2009)

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Some qualifications from (massive, complex) ensuing debate:

- ▶ Parties act on threat only if the socialist party is radical (Ahmed, 2013; Gjerløw and Rasmussen, 2022)
- ▶ A result of class **compromise** wanted by socialists too. (Cusack et al., 2007, Alesina and Glaeser, 2004)
- ▶ Response to emergent multi-partyism in general, not just socialists. (Calvo, 2009; Leemann and Mares, 2014)



- ▶ If PR exists *because* of the political strength of the working class, then the economic ‘effects’ of ES are spurious: those countries would have had left-wing policies anyway.
- ▶ If permissive systems are the *consequence* of multi-party coalitions, then Duverger’s Law is an illusion.
- ▶ More broadly: politics self-select into ES on the basis of cultural traits and history, which also shape preferences.

Good summary in Rodden (2009)

- ▶ In their basic traits, ES are so ‘sticky’ they are basically exogenous: short-term intentions overshadowed by uncertainty, randomness, time. (Shvetsova, 2003)
- ▶ Little evidence electoral reformers know what they are doing anyway. (Andrews and Jackman, 2005)

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- ▶ Little evidence electoral reformers know what they are doing anyway. (Andrews and Jackman, 2005)
- ▶ ES change not just a product of party strategies: public, normative beliefs, procedural constraints matter. (Shugart, 2008, Nunez and Jacobs, 2016, Blais et al., 2005)
- ▶ ‘Grand theories’ on origin of PR fall apart on closer historical scrutiny (Kreuzer, 2010). Alternative explanations are available (Schröder and Manow, 2020).

Should we give up on trying to identify ES effects?

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
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
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

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Recent work tries to tackle the issue of endogeneity by focussing on within-country quasi-experimental settings:

- ▶ **Diff-in-diff** designs: isolate outcomes of plausibly exogenous rule changes that only apply to some cases.
- ▶ **Regression discontinuities**: comparing cases just above or just below a threshold where electoral rules change.







See also Kantorowicz (2017).




Figure 3. The effect of crossing the 3,500 population threshold on 2001 and 2008 municipal turnout.




Figure 4. The effect of crossing the 3,500 population threshold on 2008 municipal turnout for most and least competitive municipalities.

- ▶ Different ways of thinking about ES variation:
 - ▶ Majoritarian/proportional ‘families’.
 - ▶ Continuum of district magnitudes.
 - ▶ Party vs Candidate-Centred.
- ▶ ES correlate with many key political outcomes, mostly (but not only) through their relationship to party systems.
- ▶ But to make causal claims we need to think hard about mechanisms and reverse causality (i.e. endogeneity).

Thank you for your kind
attention

- ▶ **Short videos** explaining the seat-product model and its building blocks, by Chris Hanretty.
- ▶ **Video lecture** on electoral systems, by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks ('Keys to European Politics').
- ▶ **Fruits and Votes**, Matthew Shugart's long-running (2005–) blog on electoral systems around the world.
- ▶ **Short videos** explaining FPTP, AV, MMP and STV (Politics In The Animal Kingdom).
- ▶ **Podcast** with Jack Santucci and Lee Drutman on history and prospects of electoral reform in the US.
- ▶ **An explanation of MMP** as a cheesy 1980s pop song, courtesy of the New Zealand Electoral Commission.

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